Tag Archives: Xi Jinping

Xi Sets Out What He Is Thinking

Screengrab from a live television broadcast of Xi Jinping presenting his work report to the 19th Party Congress in Beijing, October 18, 2017

MAO TRANSFORMED CHINA. Deng Xiaoping transformed China.

Xi Jinping?

Xi has placed his marker at the 19th Party Congress — ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era’. Significantly, state media are starting to report it appended to his name: ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’. Xi’s formal induction into the pantheon of Party ideology alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory cannot be far behind.

Xi Jinping Thought comprises 14 bullets points that, in short, reiterate that the Party leads everything. However, the sense of marking an epoch is as palpable as it is deliberate.

Xi portrays his China as one that will have become a global leader with international influence, a modern economy, advanced culture and world-class armed forces.

This future will come in two 15-year phases, 2020-2035 and 2035-2050.

The first phase will focus on turning fast growth into high-quality development, the deliverance of a ‘moderately prosperous society’. The second will turn China, by then likely the world’s largest economy, into Beautiful China, some nirvana-like flowering of a great modern socialist country-cum-superpower, and to do so, conveniently, in time for the 2049 centenary of the revolution that brought Mao and the Party to power. (Poverty is to be eradicated by the centenary of the Party’s founding, 2021.)

The first phase involves moving ahead with the rebalancing of the economy towards consumption-led growth that has been haltingly underway for some time. The financial system will become more market-based, and state-owned enterprises will be turned into world-class, globally competitive firm. China will become more open to foreign investors. Rule by law will be enhanced. Greater environmental protections introduced. The modernization of the PLA will be completed by 2035, giving China a world-class military, for which read on par with or better than the United States’.

Diplomatically, China will pursue global development in partnership with other countries, though it will create an alternative (and Beijing-led) global order architecture to be the framework for that. Alongside that, it will seek to strengthen its cultural soft power. Meanwhile, internally the anti-corruption campaign will continue to ensure the Party does not rot from the inside. And loyalty to the party and central leadership group must be absolute.

If this sounds like a political laundry list drawn up by a committee that is because, at heart, it is. Nor does it contain any new initiatives. Though delivered by Xi as his ‘work report’ and bearing his indelible stamp, the three and a half hour speech and its underlying text is the result of a year of consensus building involving thousands of officials.

Its purpose is to show the Party’s rank and file the signposts to the long-term actions expected from them by the leadership in all policy areas. That leadership, though, is now firmly Xi’s. The next question is how long he will feel he needs to exercise it.

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Xi Jinping: Two Eyes To The Future

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Xi Jinping

THE CRITICAL 19th Party Congress is due to get underway on October 18. A three-day preparatory meeting of the Party’s top leadership wrapped up today in Beijing.

It is commonly held that President Xi Jinping will emerge from the forthcoming Party congress with an even greater grip on power.  That may well be true; Xi will certainly be reappointed to the Party’s top post, general secretary, and might well be able to prevent Politburo Standing Committee promotions that indicate a designated successor in five years time — suggesting that Xi might stay beyond the now customary two terms.

An extension for Prime Minister Li Keqiang is less likely, with Hu Chunhua, Party boss in Guangdong (a post Xi’s father once held), being lined up to succeed him.

However, Xi’s enhanced power will not be as absolute as the personality cult building up around him might suggest. He will still have to horse trade with nodes of power and influence within the Party that have been diminished but not extinguished by his anti-corruption campaign.

The outcome of those compromises will offer a measure of the willingness of China’s elite to accept another five years of Xi’s tightening and highly personalised political control.

Little of that horse trading will be on public view at the Party Congress. Instead, there will be much play given to the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ and the ‘Chinese dream’, two somewhat ill-defined distillations of Xi’s “four identifications” that he believes all Chinese should make (with the motherland, the Chinese race, Chinese culture and the Chinese socialist road).

Part of that, also likely to be prominently presented is China-centric alternatives to the US-dominated Western international order, if not couched in quite such confrontational terms. Ambitious attempts to redraw the global geostrategic map, such as Xi’s pet ‘One Belt One Road’ project, will be presented not in terms of Chinese assertiveness and expansionism on the global stage but ‘win-win’ partnership and cooperation. China will also be presented as the rational counterpoint to US President Donald Trump that the world needs now, with Xi himself as its embodiment.

Meanwhile, much of the backroom dealing will already have been done.

Xi’s goals are twofold. First, he will wish to drive forward his self-appointed mission of reinventing both party and country so that the Party retains its monopolistic grip on power, which history suggests is at risk as China becomes richer.

Five years ago, managed economic reform was at the forefront of Xi’s agenda, but has been thwarted by vested interests, which have had to be systematically removed, mostly through the anti-corruption purge. Economic reform needs to be restarted, and before the country’s debt problem causes political problems. He still does not have the control over the economy that he does over the state security apparatus, military and, increasingly, the Party.

Second, he will want to put in place people who can carry forward that mission if and when he is gone, and to make sure they do not suffer the purges that Xi has used to decimate his rivals.

We use the verb deliberately. Roughly one in ten officials have been warned, put on probation, demoted or expelled from the Party since the crackdown started. According to Central Commission for Discipline Inspection figures published earlier this month, 1.34 million township-level and 648,000 Party members and officials in rural areas have been punished in the five years of the campaign, as well as more than 70,000 officials at or above the county-head level. More than 35,000 officials have been prosecuted.

That is a lot of ‘flies’, but several ‘tigers’ were tamed, too, including Sun Zhengcai, a Politburo member seen as a potential successor to Xi, and Wu Aiying, 65,  justice minister from 2005 until this February past and one of only a handful of senior female officials in China. The flies represent, as this Bystander noted before Xi ascended to power, how he is driven by a sense of a loss of the Party’s traditional moral values of honesty, dignity and self-respect; the tigers reveal his political ruthlessness.

This crackdown consolidated Xi’s control but also broke the implicit post-Mao pact that effectively banned large-scale purges within the elite. Xi’s followers no longer have that self-preservation guarantee, either. Xi needs to gather more power to himself now to protect them, and thus his legacy, in the future.

There are risks. The anti-corruption campaign has had a chilling effect on officialdom and morale is low. The security apparatus and military can be kept onside through expanded missions, new toys and reorganisations that elevate Xi loyalists. But the civil administration is a different matter.

Xi will need China’s massive administrative apparatus to implement his economic reforms. Their disciplined enthusiasm for doing so will be critical, especially as they will no longer be able to skim off their piece of economic progress. The anti-corruption campaign appears to have eased back on the Communist Youth League, the faction that draws heavily from cadres and government officials.

Xi’s leadership is likely to be more openly challenged within ruling circles should the economy run into serious problems, perhaps as a result of the debt crisis being mishandled or from an external shock, such as a trade war with the United States, although the state security apparatus would likely prevent either from triggering social unrest. Similarly, failures connected with his signature international projects, notably One Belt One Road, could undermine him domestically.

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Even A Small Belt And Road Would Be Huge

Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers a keynote speech at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, May 14, 2017.

ONE BELT, ONE ROAD is ambitious. A network of roads, railways, ports, pipelines and other infrastructure that will crisscross China and Central Asia connecting to Europe and Africa via land routes (the Belt) and shipping lanes (the maritime Road).

It already covers two-thirds of the world’s population, one-third of global GDP and about a quarter of the world’s trade in goods and service.  China, President Xi Jinping announced at this weekend’s Belt and Road forum in Beijing (seen above), proposes to throw $124 billion at developing his vision of the next great engine of global trade.

Those monies would be a downpayment on what is estimated to be $900 billion of related investment, financed by a variety of Chinese or China-backed banks, funds and investing and development institutions. One Belt, One Road will, depending on your point of view, be 21st-century merchant hegemony writ large or the world’s largest platform for regional collaboration.

Leaders from 29 countries, the heads of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, the UN, and a host of other dignitaries attended the forum this weekend, including most notably Russian President Vladimir Putin (absentees include the leaders of the United States, Japan and India). All the attendees, no doubt, will have had their private fears and hopes about the scale of this project to redraw over many decades the geoeconomic, and likely, the geopolitical map of Eurasia.

Whether China will hold the course, especially under Xi Jinping’s successors, is one question about the project. There are also legitimate concerns that some investment gets misallocated and ends up on being spent on ‘highways to nowhere’ and other projects that never should be built in the first place. Moreover, private and non-Chinese investment will be needed as well (and be a bellwether of global acceptance of the idea).

However, such is the scale of One Belt, One Road that even if only a fraction of it materialises, it will make Eurasia look a very different place.

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China-America First

US President Donald Trump and China's President Xi Jinping walk in the grounds of Trump's Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, April 2017.

DONALD TRUMP MARKED his first meeting as US president with the visiting President Xi Jinping with a display of naked American power, Cruise missile strikes against an airfield in Syria in retaliation for the Assad regime’s chemical attack on a hospital. The timing was coincidental, if opportune, but it was an act of defining and defending national interest of which only one of the two superpowers is currently capable, let alone comfortable, in undertaking.

The signalling was palpable. Moreover, it was an action that also had many observers quickly connecting the dots to North Korea, a country Trump had threatened unilateral US action if China did not start to exert the control over its ally that Washington believes it can and should.

Xi’s visit was always going to be scrutinised for the subtle signs of a power play between the two men. The ‘optics’ would be as important as the outcomes. However, it also carried considerable domestic political risk for Xi, making the trip to the United States early in Trump’s presidency (and to a golf course resort, at that) with all the risk of Trump’s unpredictability providing a loss of face for no very certain reward. The deflection of much of the world’s attention elsewhere would not necessarily have been unwelcome.

It is hard, though, to imagine the trip was undertaken without assurances there would be some return. The pre-trip speculation was of an agreement, if longer on affirmation than detail, on a joint reset of tackling North Korea’s nuclear ambition and some public US affirmation to Beijing over arms sales to Taiwan and the ‘one China’ policy.

In the event, the publicly announced outcomes were more modest, though likely of Beijing’s design, a 100-day plan to discuss trade talks directed at boosting US exports and reducing Washington’s trade deficit with China, and an invitation to Trump to make a state visit to China, which the US president accepted for a date to be arranged.

Trade is the lowest-hanging fruit for restoring relations between the two countries to an even keel. The direction of travel favours more US exports to China, especially once the rebalancing of the economy to more domestic consumption takes hold, while the One Belt, One Road initiative, to which the United States has now been asked to join, offers the prospect for more business and investment than China can handle alone.

Difficult issues — North Korea, Taiwan, the South China Sea — offer scant prospect of early harvesting.

The agreement to trade talks is positive, in the sense that it shows Trump can be steered away from his fiery anti-China rhetoric of the campaign trail last year. Further evidence that the reality of office is taking hold over the rhetoric of candidacy is that the Trump administration has so far declined to carry through on pre-election threats to brand China a currency manipulator or impose punitive tariffs on Chinese exports to the United States.

That the US president said that he was willing to further strengthen cooperation with China in economy, military affairs and people-to-people exchanges and support China’s efforts in pursuing corrupt officials who had fled China with ill-gotten gains will all be taken as evidence of success by Xi’s team, whose overarching goal was to restore stability and order to the relationship so they can manage it. Trump’s description of his personal relationship with Xi as “outstanding” will have been a bonus, though Trump will likely find eventually that that friendship will come with trappings.

State media have been quick to present the Florida summit as continuation of policy between the world’s two leading nations. “Expanding win-win cooperation” and “managing differences” and developing “dialogue and cooperation between China and the United States in such areas as diplomacy and security, economy, law enforcement and cyber security, as well as social and people-to-people exchanges” represents a good outcome for Xi, even if it is not the language of concrete gains for American manufacturing workers that reverse trade deficits and job losses that Trump had previously told his blue-collar economic nationalist supporters he laid squarely at China’s door.

The harsh truth is that it is not that group that stands to benefit from growing US trade with China. The winners will be the same ones that were the winners from globalisation.

The longer-term win for Xi is that summit has steered one of the world’s most important relationships, that between China and the United States, further in the direction of an arrangement of international affairs that is based on bilateral relationships between great powers than the post-World War Two system of international rules — something Xi has previously described as “a new model of great power relations” and which aligns with China’s efforts to construct a parallel architecture for global governance with itself in the centre.

The US president, who seems to prefer to focus on winning battles rather than wars, may well not realise what his guest has walked away with.

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The Core Of The Matter

CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping (centre) and other Politburo Standing Committee members seen at the Sixth Plenum held in Beijing, October 24 to 27.THE SIXTH PARTY plenum just concluded puts General Secretary Xi Jinping (above, centre) at the core of the leadership.

All party members should ‘closely unite around the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core’, said the the communique issued after the four-day behind-closed-doors meeting of the Party’s 400 top officials. Thereby, Xi enters a leadership pantheon comprising Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and the benchmark for all such Party leaders, Mao Zedong — though it was Deng who first articulated the term when designating Jiang as his successor in 1989.

Thus elevated, Xi has reinforced his authority over the party, potentially allowing him to extend his dominance for years to come. Another five years as General Secretary, along with his other two jobs as President and head of the People’s Liberation, now seems a given.

The Sixth Plenum decided that a Party Congress  — the quinquennial meeting of the Party’s top 2,000 members — would be held in the second half of next year. That is the forum for appointing the new top leadership for the next five years. Under current Party rules, all but Xi and Prime Minister Li Keqiang among the seven-strong Politburo Standing Committee, the apex of power, will have to retire on the grounds of age, opening the way for Xi to pack it with his proteges.

From the new appointees will come the leadership through which Xi will exert his power after his retirement, assuming he does not flout the convention of stepping aside after two five-year terms to stay in office as well as power.

Xi’s authority is far from absolute, which gives the plenum’s other important decisions — the adoption of strict rules of Party discipline that apply at all levels and revised codes of intra-party political life — their significance.

Xi has been steadily consolidating his power through his anti-corruption campaign and by centring the leadership’s decision making in areas such as military reform, security and the economy on central committees that he controls. This in part is because systemic corruption at the local level has frustrated his plans for ‘rebalancing’ the economy that he sees as essential for maintaining the Party’s ability to retain its monopoly grasp on political power.

However much power at the top concentrates in the general secretary, Xi cannot avoid the fact that China’s social stability depends on maintaining a delicate balance between the top-down authority of the central leadership and the bottom-up legitimacy of local governance.

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Xi’s Jiang Dilemma

Jiang Zemin (L) and Xi Jinping seen at an undated National Day reception

LAST AUGUST, RUMOURS circulated that former but still-powerful President Jiang Zemin, then just turning 89, had been placed ‘under control’ — a measure to restrict his freedom of movement for a while.

Jiang (seen left above) slipped from public view and it was being said that this was a prelude to President Xi Jinping moving against the man who had been instrumental in elevating him to the top leadership positions, but whose desire to rule from retirement remains the greatest constraint on Xi’s political supremacy.

Jiang led the Party from 1989 to 2002, but has remained one of the most politically powerful actors since. Before retiring, he appointed acolytes to key positions and let them establish varying degrees of autonomy from the formal leadership, particularly in the security apparatus.

With Zhou Yongkang, as head of the security services, and Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, in place as vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission, the Party agency that controls the PLA, Jiang had more sway over the military and the security services than the man who succeeded him as Party boss and president, Hu Jintao. And he had enough power in within the Party to promote Xi over Hu’s favoured successor, Li Keqaing, who had to settle for being prime minister.

Once in the top positions, however, Xi showed more determination that Hu to shake free of Jiang’s controlling hand. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign was directed against many associated with Jiang’s Shanghai faction. Zhou, like Xu and Guo, three of the biggest ‘big tigers’ snared, were purged and expelled from the Party. One way to view that is as a rooting out of the parallel power network Jiang had established and restoring the leadership’s centralised control.

Rumours are circulating again that Xi may now feel political secure enough to move against the biggest tiger of them all, Jiang himself. This, the word is, would not be another round of control, but a prosecution for corruption.

Xi’s frustration with what he perceives as Jiang’s hinderance of his political control and economic reforms (which Xi sees as critical to the Party’s success in the existential struggle in which he believes it is engaged, but which would financially disadvantage many members of Jiang’s ‘Shanghai’ faction) is well known.

This, rarely, bubbled into public view when an editorial in the People’s Daily referred to former leaders who prevented their successors “rolling up their sleeves and doing bold work” and sniped at leaders who, “being unhappy to retire … do everything they can to extend their power”. Most readers would have quickly parsed the list of ‘former leaders’ to one.

Darker minds talk about conspiracies by Jiang’s supporters to overthrow Xi. Meanwhile, newly published writings by Xi carry a similarly coded warning that even ‘super-emperors’ should not be spared from the anti-corruption campaign.

Prosecuting Jiang would carry enormous risks for Xi. For one, it would sweep away the unwritten promise of immunity for former Party leaders that has allowed a leadership succession every decade.

Xi might then feel he would have to hold onto power beyond the customary ten years. That and the vacuum created by ripping up the old political rules that delivered a steady escalator of professional advancement and personal enrichment could trigger a revolt in a Party where morale at many levels is already fragile.

However, Xi is also time boxed. At the 19th Party Congress next year, the new generation of leaders — Xi’s heirs — could be expected to be nailing down their promotions for the top jobs which are due to rotate in 2022. If Xi is to move openly against Jiang, he will need to have done so — successfully — before then.

The calculation, though, is finely balanced.

The purges and Xi’s reorganisation of the PLA have diminished Jiang’ s influence in the military. That will have choked off some of the ‘pay for promotion’ that has enriched the Shanghai faction, just as the anti-graft probes into the state oil industry have closed off another honeypot. But it persists in the Party, including in the Politburo — which makes the promotions at the next Party Congress so critical. Taking Jiang down now would cement Xi’s absolute grip on power from the Congress on.

However, it would also risk splitting the Party and perhaps fatally damage it at a time when a slowing economy makes it especially vulnerable to social unrest, particularly if the newly affluent middle class starts to feel the effects.

Xi may also reckon that he need not take the risk; that he has taken down enough of Jiang’s inner circle to have undercut Jiang from below, and that Jiang will finally give up the game knowing Xi has the evidence to charge him whenever he chooses.  And there is always the alternative of hoping that age and infirmity do the job for him.

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Two Gentleman Of China

WHEN XI JINPING and Ma Ying-jeou meet in a hotel in Singapore for 20 minutes on Saturday, the diplomatic sensitivities require both men to address each other plainly.

Neither man will formally acknowledge the other’s official title at what will be the first meeting between the presidents of China and Taiwan ever and the first between the leader of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang (KMT) since Mao Zedong, at Washington’s prompting, reluctantly met Chiang Kai-shek in 1945  to try to resolve the civil war they had been fighting for 20 years.

Were they to be speaking in English, they would address each other as Mr Xi and Mr Ma.

Their encounter will be a landmark occasion, but its significance lies in the fact that it is taking place at all, not in what might be said or achieved, which is likely little. There will be no agreements signed and no joint statement afterwards. Indeed, the two men will hold separate press conferences.

That said, the meeting is a bigger gamble for Xi than Ma as he is injecting himself into Taiwanese domestic politics. Ma has to step down next year after completing two terms as president during which he has pushed for closer ties across the Straits of Taiwan. Eric Chu, the Kuomintang (KMT) candidate in January 16’s election of his successor, is trailing the pro-independence opposition Democratic Progressive Party’s candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, who is not trusted in Beijing.

The KMT dumped its original candidate, the unpopular Hung Hsiu-chu, barely three months ago in an effort to close the gap with Tsai and Xi will hope his meeting with Ma will boost Chu’s efforts.

The risk is that the opposite happens if Taiwanese voters, who handed the KMT a punishing defeat in last year’s local elections, perceive the meeting as an unwarranted meddling in domestic affairs.

Regardless of the electoral impacts, it looks to this Bystander’s eye that the closer integration of Taiwan and the mainland will slow whichever candidate wins the presidency. Tsai is campaigning to reverse Ma’s policy and Chu has said the even though he favours continuing to increase economic cooperation, he would pursue it incrementally and at a slower pace than Ma.

Every Chinese leader since Mao has wanted to reunify what Beijing regards as its renegade province with the mainland. With the hollowing of Taiwan’s economic base, its brain drain and ever diminishing diplomatic recognition around the world (although the crucial support and protection of the United States remains), doing nothing and saying less might be Xi’s better bet.

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