Tag Archives: rebalancing

China’s Economy: Normal Slowing Will Resume in 2018

THE ECONOMY STORMED along in the second half of last year, taking growth for the year to 6.9%, comfortably outstripping the official target of ‘around 6.5%’.

It was riding the coattails of the fiscal stimulus introduced in the first half of the year and also the pick-up in global trade, partly helped by the robust growth in the United States and some recovery in Europe, which boosted China’s exports. At 8.7% of China’s GDP growth, net export volumes made their largest contribution to growth since 2008.

Policymakers have been managing a slowdown from the giddy decades of double-digit growth. The overall lesson from last week’s figures is that economy is fitfully rebalancing and that there was some slowdown in credit growth as official efforts to cool the property market, deleverage and upgrade industrial capacity gained some traction.

That last year turned out to be the first acceleration since 2010 should prove to be an anomaly. Normal slowing will resume this year. And especially if policymakers push ahead with measures to control financial risks.

The most recent forecast from the World Bank, which recently upped its estimate of GDP growth in 2017 to 6.8% (a 0.3 percentage point increase from its forecast a year ago and reiterated in June) says it expects 6.4% growth this year (a 0.1 percentage point increase from its previous number).

Beijing has plenty of headroom in meeting its 2010 target of doubling aggregate and per capita growth by 2020. The economy needs to average no more than 6.3% growth to achieve that.

That headroom will also let Beijing tackle its most pressing economic-related problems: curbing escalating debt; cutting excess heavy industrial capacity; becoming environmentally cleaner; and dealing with the risk of unemployment as the economy is rebalanced towards domestic consumption and higher-value-added manufacturing.

Where the margins of safety are considerably thinner is if there is a trade war with the United States.

As we noted recently, US President Donald Trump is itching to impose tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminium imports into the United States. More recently Washington has said that an investigation into intellectual property transfers to China has been launched, with Trump warning that China is in for “a very big intellectual property fine”.

His self-restraint because he needs Beijing’s help with North Korea is wearing thin. Nor will it have been helped by the revelation that an ex-CIA officer arrested in New York this week may have been the mole responsible for passing information to Chinese intelligence that led to the dismantling and death of the CIA’s intelligence network in China between 2010 and 2012.

Advertisements

Leave a comment

Filed under China-U.S., Economy, Trade

World Bank Ups Its Prospects For China’s Economy

THE WORLD BANK has become more bullish on China, at least for the near-term. In its newly published annual Global Economic Prospects, it has upped its estimate of GDP growth in 2017 to 6.8% (an 0.3 percentage point increase from its forecast a year ago and reiterated in June) and said it expects 6.4% growth this year (an 0.1 percentage point increase from its previous number).

China benefited, the Bank now says, from the recovery in world trade last year, fiscal stimulus and the rebalancing of the economy, which eased the drivers of the economy away from state-led investment. Inflation rose but was still within target and housing price increases moderated in response to policy measures.

The current account surplus continued to narrow, but the clampdown on capital outflows meant that exchange-rate pressures eased and foreign-exchange reserves recovered modestly.

On the flip side, non-financial sector debt continued to grow, reaching 260% of GDP, regardless of further monetary and regulatory tightening. Credit growth still outpaces nominal GDP growth.

The Bank says that financial sector vulnerabilities — particularly high corporate indebtedness in sectors with overcapacity and deteriorating profitability — are one of the key downside risks to growth.

Others include the possibility of protectionist policies in advanced economies (for which read the United States) and rising geopolitical tensions (for which read mainly North Korea).

The Bank also expects the economy to continue its measured deceleration, averaging 6.3% growth in 2019 and 2020, and less beyond that as adverse demographics kick in over the next decade.

A steeper-than-expected slowdown or debt- or geopolitical-driven financial stress would have impacts well beyond China’s borders.

The Bank’s view is that authorities have substantial ‘policy buffers’ to absorb financial shocks. Nonetheless, it, like others, calls for further structural reform to reallocate economic activity towards more productive sectors.

This would include financial and corporate sector reform as well as greater efforts to deleverage and improve the fiscal sustainability of provincial, municipal and local government.

Leave a comment

Filed under Economy

A Better Quality Economy

WHAT CAUGHT THIS Bystander’s eye from the annual Central Economic Work Conference, the key closed-door economic policy meeting of the year held in the PLA’s Jingxi Hotel in Beijing last week, was that economic policy priorities were set for the next three years rather than the usual one.

That will take policymaking to the midpoint of President Xi Jinping’s second term and the start of what should be the next cycle of leadership regeneration. It likely signals that there will be no alternative economic path than the one that leads to making good on Xi’s promise to build a “well-off society” by then.

The work conference was the first gathering of the Central Committee since the 19th party congress. It marked a start to translating Xi’s concepts of the next stage of China’s development being a transition from ‘rapid growth’ to ‘high-quality growth’ into plans and targets that each province and ministry will then have to turn into tasks and initiatives.

Xi has greatly tightened his grip over economic policy since taking power five years ago.The State Council, the mechanism through which the prime minister had formed economic policy, has become an implementation agency. The Central Leading Group of Financial and Economic Affairs, headed by Xi, is where the decisions that matter now get taken.

The outcome of the discussions at the work conference, which involved the 400 most important officials in the country, will not be disclosed until next March when they will be announced within the government’s work report to the annual parliamentary session as the economic targets for 2018.

All that is known at this point from state media is the already well-advertised transition from rapid to high-quality growth involving an economic model with “more focus on fairness, the environment and a joyful life”. The top three priorities for delivering that are alleviating poverty, pollution and financial risks.

Parsing that suggests that poverty relief will take precedence over maximising overall GDP growth, and financial stability over reform and liberalisation. Thus financial policy will focus on deleveraging through controlling credit growth rather than reducing existing corporate debt. Monetary policy will tighten in 2018; the external account will be kept stable, rather than opened up.

Systemic financial industry corruption will be tackled, particularly by cracking down on murky practice within shadow banking; more regulation in this area, particularly for asset management products, is likely next year. The introduction of a 3% value-added tax on some financial products will also provide a useful administrative tool for policymakers to bring shadow banking more in line.

It all adds up to a gamble on steering the real economy clear of financial risk through controlled growth and economic management. The gamble is probably most vulnerable to an external economic shock such as a deterioration in economic relations with the Trump administration in the United States.

The concern for Beijing is not the general macroeconomic one from US monetary policy ‘normalising’ but the danger that Washington’s China hawks get the upper hand in the administration and attempt to constrain China’s access to and trade in technology thereby crimping the innovation so necessary to rebalancing the economy.

What is less uncertain is that Beijing’s efforts to tackle environmental problems, and particularly air pollution, will be driven forward aggressively, regardless of the cost. That is for reasons of domestic stability, new-industry development and international leadership.

Leave a comment

Filed under Economy

Putting Financial Stability Ahead Of Growth

IN THE SIX years since the International Monetary Fund last published a Financial System Stability Assessment of China, credit has boomed, spreading shadow banking has added complexity to the system, and moral hazard has grown as belief in the implicit state guarantee to firms and investors has remained unshakeable.

In short, financial instability risks have grown rapidly.

Within the constraint of maintaining growth and employment, authorities have responded to mitigate the risk and to put the expanding financial system on the right footing to support the ‘rebalancing’ of the economy from being led by infrastructure investment and export manufacturing to being more consumption and service driven.

There is much more to do, however, as the Fund outlines in its latest assessment.

Some of that will be politically challenging, notably allowing firms to fail, markets to fall and investors to lose money, which will be the consequences of removing the implicit guarantee that the state stands behind financial loans and products. They will also require detailed technical work on bankruptcy procedures, financial education and even social security safety nets.

Political priorities will also need to be adjusted to put financial stability ahead of economic growth. That is already starting to happen as job losses, particularly in heavy industry and primary production, and slowing economic growth more generally shows. However, the tolerance for both is greater at the higher levels of government than at the local one, where the expectation among officials that promotion depends on creating good economic growth numbers is proving hard to break. The massive task of reforming local government finances is probably a multi-decade, not just multi-year endeavour.

China Financial System Growth

Improving the supervision of the financial sector is an easier piece to bite off, and authorities have been systematically expanding that for banks, insurance companies and securities firms in recent years. The Fund recommends setting up an umbrella regulator focusing solely on financial stability to coordinate the oversight of systemic risk across sectors.

This regulator, which would be an institutional version of the recently established Financial Stability and Development Committee, will need authority and independence over the sector supervisors and an improved flow of data given the scale and complexity of the country’s financial system, especially in some of the murkier areas of shadow banking. As was seen in the West with the 2008 financial crisis, failure to monitor risks outside the regulatory perimeter can be the most damaging failure of all.

The Fund also suggests that the well-advertised rapid growth of debt requires banks to hold a plumper cushion of capital, and particularly at the larger banks that are systemically important. Greater capital reserves would not only provide a buffer in the event of a sudden or severe economic downturn, but also against the particular risk with Chinese characteristics of the extensive off-balance-sheet borrowing, notably for wealth management products, that the banks implicitly guarantee.

In the same vein, banks and financial institutions should be nudged through lending rules to stop using short-term borrowing to finance their investments and instead both lend and fund longer-term. Should it come to it, and a financial institution goes under, regulators should have their powers expanded in line with international standards to let the firm to ‘fail safely’ rather than prop it up with public funds.

Another area that the Fund urges oversight is digital finance, or fintech, which as expanded significantly in China as elsewhere. Existing oversight frameworks are often ill-fitting for the innovation that comes with fintech, though the need for systemic safety and soundness is not diminished.

The Fund calls China ‘the global centre of fintech’, noting the growth of peer-to-peer lending and the emergence of payment systems run by internet retailers such as Alibaba that are competitors to the banks’. Smartphone app WeChat’s WeBank is already a competitor to banks’ lending.

The scale of this is still small compared to the overall size of the banking system and thus not a systemic risk — yet. Nonetheless, they will need to be brought into the regulatory and supervisory scheme of things. This is starting to happen following the State Council last year launching an overhaul of internet finance oversight.

 

1 Comment

Filed under Banking, Economy

China Will Rebalance The World’s Energy

Wind turbines in Xinjiang, 2005. Photo credit: Chris Lim. Licenced under Creative Commons

ACROSS THE MORE heavily industrialised provinces, factories and plants are being ordered to shut down or limit production during the winter months. This is both to curtail excess industrial production and also to curb seasonal smog, a byproduct of China being the world’s largest consumer of coal, which provides 65% of its energy.

The newly published annual outlook from the International Energy Agency (IEA) brings a glimmer of a silver lining to that particular dark cloud. China, it says, will remain a ‘towering presence’ in coal markets, but it believes coal use peaked in 2013 and is set to decline by almost 15% over the period to 2040.

China burnt 2.75 billion tonnes of coal in 2013, more than the rest of the world put together.

It is no secret that Beijing sees pollution as a potential political problem and that it is keen for China to go green. Lian Weiliang, deputy head of the National Development and Reform Commission, said earlier this week that the country was ahead of pace in its goal to cut coal capacity by 500 million tonnes within three to five years of 2016, while the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology forecast that environmental protection equipment manufacturing would be a 1 trillion-yuan ($150 billion) industry by 2020.

The new era will be about energy policy where the focus is on electricity, natural gas and cleaner, high-efficiency and digital technologies, not an energy system dominated by coal and a legacy of serious environmental problems, giving rise to almost 2 million premature deaths each year from poor air quality.

The switch will also flow from rebalancing the economy from a development model based on heavy industry, infrastructure development and the export of manufactured goods to one driven by higher-value-added manufacturing, services and domestic consumption.

Signs of the new era are there to be seen. Energy demand growth slowed markedly from an average of 8% per year from 2000 to 2012 to less than 2% per year since 2012. Official plans call for it to slow further to an average of 1% per year to 2040.

Energy efficiency regulation is a large part of the explanation. Without new efficiency measures, the IEA reckons, end-use consumption in 2040 would be 40% higher.

Nonetheless, such is the compounding effect of economic growth that by 2040, per-capita energy consumption in China will exceed that of the European Union and electricity demand for cooling alone in China will exceed the total electricity demand of Japan today.

The IEA reckons that China will need to add the equivalent of today’s United States power system to its electricity infrastructure to meet the demand expected by 2040. Such will be the scale of China’s clean energy deployment, technology exports and outward investment that it will play a huge role in determining global energy trends and in particular provide the momentum behind the low-carbon transition.

“When China changes, everything changes”, as the IEA says.

The agency lays out the future thus:

One-third of the world’s new wind power and solar PV is installed in China … and China also accounts for more than 40% of global investment in electric vehicles. China provides a quarter of the projected rise in global gas demand and its projected imports of 280 billion cubic metres in 2040 are second only to those of the European Union, making China a lynchpin of global gas trade. China overtakes the United States as the largest oil consumer around 2030, and its net imports reach 13 million barrels per day in 2040. But stringent fuel-efficiency measures for cars and trucks, and a shift which sees one-in-four cars being electric by 2040, means that China is no longer the main driving force behind global oil use – demand growth is larger in India post-2025.

China will also continue to lead a gradual rise in nuclear output, overtaking the United States by 2030 to become the largest producer of nuclear-based electricity.

The shift to a more services-oriented economy and a cleaner energy mix will take a decade to have its effects on the skies above. The IEA projects carbon dioxide emissions will plateau at only slightly above current level by 2030 before starting to fall back.

Leave a comment

Filed under Energy, Environment

IMF Again Warns China Off Growth For Growth’s Sake

THE IMF’S NEWLY published World Economic Outlook projects a 0.1 percentage point increase in GDP growth this year over last, to 6.8%. That is an upward revision of 0.1 percentage point to its July forecast, based on policy easing and stimulus to domestic demand earlier in the year.

However, the Fund sees the glide path of managed slowing growth resuming next year, with GDP growth forecast at 6.5% in 2018 (again up 0.1 percentage point from July’s forecast, and up 0.2 percentage points from its April forecast) and thereafter slowing further to 5.8% by 2022.

By that point, the IMF expects China to be growing more slowly than the emerging and developing Asia average, forecast at 6.3%. That would a phenomenon not seen since China started its double-digit growth spurt.

That, in its way, would be a mark of success for the rebalancing of the economy towards being more consumption-driven and less dependent for growth on infrastructure investment and exports. The IMF is projecting that China’s current account balance will have shrunk to $28.8 billion by 2022, against $196.4 billion last year, and almost one-tenth of the level it was a decade ago. As a percentage of GDP, the effect will be even more dramatic: a projected 0.2% in 2022 against 4.7% in 2009.

All neat projections, but realizing them is not without risk, most notably in managing debt:

Over the medium term, dealing with financial sector challenges will be essential. Minimizing the risk of a sharp slowdown in China will require the Chinese authorities to intensify their efforts to rein in the credit expansion.

The conundrum is that 6%-plus growth is necessary for China to have met its target of doubling real GDP between 2010 and 2020. To make sure it does, Beijing will be in no hurry to withdraw its stimulus.

However, as this Bystander and others have noted before, delay comes at the cost of further increases in debt, making the issue more difficult to resolve through the necessary measures of tighter supervision, reined-in expansion of credit and writes down of the underlying stock of bad assets.

This, in turn, would slow rebalancing and reduce the policy space available to respond in case of an abrupt shock to the system, internal or external.

Such shocks are not difficult to imagine, and are detailed by the Fund:

a funding shock in the short-term interbank market or the funding market for wealth-management products; the imposition of trade barriers by trading partners; or a return of capital outflow pressures because of a faster-than-expected normalisation of US interest rates.

The political dimension to this, unaddressed by the IMF, not surprisingly given its sensitivity, is whether President Xi Jinping will emerge from next week’s Party Congress in a sufficiently strong position to be able deemphasize near-term growth targets and implement more reforms that would enhance the sustainability of growth. Without doing so, he will be unable achieve his long-term goal of maintaining the Party’s monopoly grip on power while transforming China’s economy to its next phase of development.

2 Comments

Filed under Economy