THE IMF’S NEWLY published World Economic Outlook projects a 0.1 percentage point increase in GDP growth this year over last, to 6.8%. That is an upward revision of 0.1 percentage point to its July forecast, based on policy easing and stimulus to domestic demand earlier in the year.
However, the Fund sees the glide path of managed slowing growth resuming next year, with GDP growth forecast at 6.5% in 2018 (again up 0.1 percentage point from July’s forecast, and up 0.2 percentage points from its April forecast) and thereafter slowing further to 5.8% by 2022.
By that point, the IMF expects China to be growing more slowly than the emerging and developing Asia average, forecast at 6.3%. That would a phenomenon not seen since China started its double-digit growth spurt.
That, in its way, would be a mark of success for the rebalancing of the economy towards being more consumption-driven and less dependent for growth on infrastructure investment and exports. The IMF is projecting that China’s current account balance will have shrunk to $28.8 billion by 2022, against $196.4 billion last year, and almost one-tenth of the level it was a decade ago. As a percentage of GDP, the effect will be even more dramatic: a projected 0.2% in 2022 against 4.7% in 2009.
All neat projections, but realizing them is not without risk, most notably in managing debt:
Over the medium term, dealing with financial sector challenges will be essential. Minimizing the risk of a sharp slowdown in China will require the Chinese authorities to intensify their efforts to rein in the credit expansion.
The conundrum is that 6%-plus growth is necessary for China to have met its target of doubling real GDP between 2010 and 2020. To make sure it does, Beijing will be in no hurry to withdraw its stimulus.
However, as this Bystander and others have noted before, delay comes at the cost of further increases in debt, making the issue more difficult to resolve through the necessary measures of tighter supervision, reined-in expansion of credit and writes down of the underlying stock of bad assets.
This, in turn, would slow rebalancing and reduce the policy space available to respond in case of an abrupt shock to the system, internal or external.
Such shocks are not difficult to imagine, and are detailed by the Fund:
a funding shock in the short-term interbank market or the funding market for wealth-management products; the imposition of trade barriers by trading partners; or a return of capital outflow pressures because of a faster-than-expected normalisation of US interest rates.
The political dimension to this, unaddressed by the IMF, not surprisingly given its sensitivity, is whether President Xi Jinping will emerge from next week’s Party Congress in a sufficiently strong position to be able deemphasize near-term growth targets and implement more reforms that would enhance the sustainability of growth. Without doing so, he will be unable achieve his long-term goal of maintaining the Party’s monopoly grip on power while transforming China’s economy to its next phase of development.