Tag Archives: Communist Youth League

Xi Jinping: Two Eyes To The Future

xi-jinping

Xi Jinping

THE CRITICAL 19th Party Congress is due to get underway on October 18. A three-day preparatory meeting of the Party’s top leadership wrapped up today in Beijing.

It is commonly held that President Xi Jinping will emerge from the forthcoming Party congress with an even greater grip on power.  That may well be true; Xi will certainly be reappointed to the Party’s top post, general secretary, and might well be able to prevent Politburo Standing Committee promotions that indicate a designated successor in five years time — suggesting that Xi might stay beyond the now customary two terms.

An extension for Prime Minister Li Keqiang is less likely, with Hu Chunhua, Party boss in Guangdong (a post Xi’s father once held), being lined up to succeed him.

However, Xi’s enhanced power will not be as absolute as the personality cult building up around him might suggest. He will still have to horse trade with nodes of power and influence within the Party that have been diminished but not extinguished by his anti-corruption campaign.

The outcome of those compromises will offer a measure of the willingness of China’s elite to accept another five years of Xi’s tightening and highly personalised political control.

Little of that horse trading will be on public view at the Party Congress. Instead, there will be much play given to the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ and the ‘Chinese dream’, two somewhat ill-defined distillations of Xi’s “four identifications” that he believes all Chinese should make (with the motherland, the Chinese race, Chinese culture and the Chinese socialist road).

Part of that, also likely to be prominently presented is China-centric alternatives to the US-dominated Western international order, if not couched in quite such confrontational terms. Ambitious attempts to redraw the global geostrategic map, such as Xi’s pet ‘One Belt One Road’ project, will be presented not in terms of Chinese assertiveness and expansionism on the global stage but ‘win-win’ partnership and cooperation. China will also be presented as the rational counterpoint to US President Donald Trump that the world needs now, with Xi himself as its embodiment.

Meanwhile, much of the backroom dealing will already have been done.

Xi’s goals are twofold. First, he will wish to drive forward his self-appointed mission of reinventing both party and country so that the Party retains its monopolistic grip on power, which history suggests is at risk as China becomes richer.

Five years ago, managed economic reform was at the forefront of Xi’s agenda, but has been thwarted by vested interests, which have had to be systematically removed, mostly through the anti-corruption purge. Economic reform needs to be restarted, and before the country’s debt problem causes political problems. He still does not have the control over the economy that he does over the state security apparatus, military and, increasingly, the Party.

Second, he will want to put in place people who can carry forward that mission if and when he is gone, and to make sure they do not suffer the purges that Xi has used to decimate his rivals.

We use the verb deliberately. Roughly one in ten officials have been warned, put on probation, demoted or expelled from the Party since the crackdown started. According to Central Commission for Discipline Inspection figures published earlier this month, 1.34 million township-level and 648,000 Party members and officials in rural areas have been punished in the five years of the campaign, as well as more than 70,000 officials at or above the county-head level. More than 35,000 officials have been prosecuted.

That is a lot of ‘flies’, but several ‘tigers’ were tamed, too, including Sun Zhengcai, a Politburo member seen as a potential successor to Xi, and Wu Aiying, 65,  justice minister from 2005 until this February past and one of only a handful of senior female officials in China. The flies represent, as this Bystander noted before Xi ascended to power, how he is driven by a sense of a loss of the Party’s traditional moral values of honesty, dignity and self-respect; the tigers reveal his political ruthlessness.

This crackdown consolidated Xi’s control but also broke the implicit post-Mao pact that effectively banned large-scale purges within the elite. Xi’s followers no longer have that self-preservation guarantee, either. Xi needs to gather more power to himself now to protect them, and thus his legacy, in the future.

There are risks. The anti-corruption campaign has had a chilling effect on officialdom and morale is low. The security apparatus and military can be kept onside through expanded missions, new toys and reorganisations that elevate Xi loyalists. But the civil administration is a different matter.

Xi will need China’s massive administrative apparatus to implement his economic reforms. Their disciplined enthusiasm for doing so will be critical, especially as they will no longer be able to skim off their piece of economic progress. The anti-corruption campaign appears to have eased back on the Communist Youth League, the faction that draws heavily from cadres and government officials.

Xi’s leadership is likely to be more openly challenged within ruling circles should the economy run into serious problems, perhaps as a result of the debt crisis being mishandled or from an external shock, such as a trade war with the United States, although the state security apparatus would likely prevent either from triggering social unrest. Similarly, failures connected with his signature international projects, notably One Belt One Road, could undermine him domestically.

Leave a comment

Filed under Politics & Society

A Petition At The Tip Of A Political Iceberg

The open petition to President Hu Jintao from retired provincial officials criticizing Zhou Yongkang, the member of the Politburo who oversees the China’s internal security apparatus, is remarkable. Such public expressions of discontent are rare in the general let alone the specific. That this one has emerged indicates serious discontent among the Party’s grassroots over the course of political reform and an unease with the appeal by some leaders to Maoist nostalgia, itself a proxy for the battle between those who see the Party’s future best assured by continuing economic reform and its consequent political reform, and those who see it best assured by a return to Party discipline and a statist economy enforcing social harmony.

The 16 signatories are all retired officials in their late 70s or 80s, giving them the protection of age that serving officials wouldn’t enjoy. Some gain further moral authority from being Party members since before 1949. As such, they will remember the worst periods of Mao’s rule, including the famines of the Great Leap Forward and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. The fall of Bo Xilai, a protege of Zhou’s, has given them an opportunity to speak on behalf of what we suspect are many tens of thousands of younger serving officials who, while growing up in a very different China, share their elders’ feelings but have to be far more circumspect in expressing them.

The petition also serves as a reminder that the sway of the princelings, the elite 400 families who exercise extensive influence over the Party, the economy and the military, may be broad, but is not necessarily deep as far as the Party’s grassroots go. That is where one of the Party’s other main factions, the Communist Youth League, has its base. Princelings dismissively refer to leaders who come up through the league as “sons of shopkeepers.” To what extent that class warfare will make itself apparent in the jockeying for top jobs now underway in the leadership transition remains unclear to outsiders. But if we can’t see through the opaqueness we do hear clearly the occasional creak of an iceberg under stress.

1 Comment

Filed under Politics & Society

Mr Xi Visits America Again

Xi Jinping, the Chinese vice-president the rest of the world is taking to be China’s next president, visits the U.S. this week. It is a land he knows better than apparently the U.S. knows him. Xi is seen above (center, with plastic cup) at a picnic in Muscatine, Iowa 27  years ago with a visiting Hebei provincial agricultural delegation. He will be returning there with great PR fanfare during his latest trip. This Bystander thought it timely to republish a piece we first published last July  looking at Xi and China’s most important leadership transition in the three decades since Deng Xioaping set the party and country on the road of economic reform.

China’s next top leaders will, for the first time, be men born after the Party seized power in 1949. With their ascendancy, modern China will cross a political and demographic Rubicon. Their generation is the great, great grandchild of Mao’s first generation of leaders. Their youth occurred during the Cultural Revolution, when many of their families were purged, but they embraced the Party nevertheless, and many advanced through its ranks by being “redder than red”. They are more worldly than their predecessors, mostly educated at top Chinese universities, more likely than their predecessors to have social science rather than engineering degrees, and be more likely to send their own children to top U.S. and European universities. Their working political life has only known China transforming itself as a rising political and economic power, yet they are as pragmatically committed as their predecessors to the Party’s monopoly on power, if divided over whether the basis for that should be ideological or economic.

The distinction matters. China is at a critical stage of its economic development. It has, self-evidently, developed at great pace through the initial phases of industrialization and urbanization over the past 30 years. Now it must kick on and leap the great wall that has stopped other developing nations completing the transformation to a developed economy.

When per capita income reaches $10,000-12,000 a year (in 2007 dollars), developing economies tend to stop developing without institutional change. China’s annual per capital income is $4,000. At current growth rates that gives it less than a decade–the watch of the new leadership–before it hits the wall. It will need to make deep structural reforms, both economic and political, if it is going to be able to vault it. Regardless of the fact that even if it does clear the wall, China will still be a middle-income country–absolute size of the economy is irrelevant in this respect, even if China passes the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy–no country has yet managed to be both developed and a single-party state.

That sets up a dilemma. If the Party’s legitimacy to monopolistic rule depends on continuing to deliver the economic growth that keeps its citizens getting richer and the country stronger and if China’s rapid economic growth cannot continue beyond a certain point without institutional reform, then managing the role of government in the economy and overcoming state-owned vested interests–in other words reforming itself–becomes the new leadership’s most important concern.

If, on the other hand, the Party’s legitimacy to monopolistic rule rests on an ideology of the mandate of Mao, it will still need to forge a statist economy that can deliver the economic development to ensure social stability and regional clout, and be unable to escape the fact that economic growth cannot continue beyond a certain point without institutional reform to support its move up the arc of development and prevent the ossifying of incumbent interests. So, again, managing the role of government in the economy and arbitrating between state-owned vested interests becomes the new leadership’s most important concern.

China is not only self-evidently non-Western, but it has a self-consciously distinct history, culture and political system, so it could develop a distinct economic system. Chinese exceptionalism is not anymore unreasonable than American exceptionalism. But in that event, the Party will still have to operate and against a back-drop of a globally connected economy in a world that is already wary of China’s perceived mercantilism and rising power and status. Though unlikely, that could make China turn inward and neo-isolationist, relying on its growing internal market and a demographic bias to becoming a deficit country over the next decade, to drive the next stage in its economic development.

For now, there is every indication that China will continue on its present course. Indeed, there is a plan for that. The new leadership will come into position midway though the current five-year plan. Yet what looks from the outside to be a seamless transfer of power from one generation of leadership to the next belies the factional infighting that occurs out of public view.

So far, it is the princelings, the descendants of Mao’s original revolutionary leaders, an elite collective dynasty of some 400 families who hold extensive sway over the Party, army and the economy, that are coming out on top. One of their own, Xi Jinping, born 1953, is emerging as Hu Jintao’s successor as paramount leader, successively taking over from Hu the positions of Party general secretary in 2012, president in 2013 and chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2014. By then the top Party, state and military jobs will again be united in one man, if Xi successfully consolidates over the course of the two-year transition his position as the first ranked in the Politburo’s standing committee, the small group of men, currently nine, that constitute the inner sanctum of the Party’s–and China’s–power.

Xi has outflanked Li Keqiang, the only other post-49er to make it to the Politburo’s standing committee, where he ranks seventh out of nine, one place below Xi, and who was Hu’s protege until Hu bowed to political realities and switched his support to Xi. Li, like Hu rose through the Party’s other leading faction, the Communist Youth League (YCL) whose power base is the party’s grassroots. Princelings dismissively refer to the leaders who come up through the YCL as “sons of shopkeepers.”

Xi rise from provincial official to national leader has been rapid. Cunning, calculating and ambitious Xi plays politics like a chameleon playing poker. He has worked in the countryside and in cities, north and south, in villages and in big cities, giving him a broad network of connections. He is a student of Marxism but not known to be ideological. Though never in the army, he has strong links with the armed forces. His father, General Xi Zhongxun, was a founding father of Mao’s revolution and his wife, Peng Liyuan, is both a celebrity folk singer and a major general in the PLA. He has a reputation for being pro-business (his father was purged by Mao for promoting economic opening and became one of Deng Xiaoping’s key mentors and lieutenants in instituting economic reform, particularly the early experiments in Guangdong and Shenzhen) but he is also famous for being ‘clean’, having cleared up corruption in Fujian in the 1990s and Shanghai in the 2000s, and is disdainful of China’s nouveau riche. He is calm and cautious, and above all seen as a team player–while all the while skillfully climbing a ladder of political patrons.

Though scarcely charismatic, Xi will be a more imposing figure on the world stage than his predecessors (though Hu set a low bar). Physically, he is tall and stocky so photo shoots with other world leaders will play well at home. With a sister in Canada, a brother in Taiwan and a daughter at Harvard in the U.S., to which he has been a visitor since the 1970s, he knows more about the world than the world knows about this plain- if rarely outspoken man who plays his political cards close to his chest–or about what he and his fellow new leaders want to do once they reach the apex of power they have scrabbled so hard to ascend.

As already noted, they will take over half way through the current five-year plan, so their initial path is set. But the next Politburo’s composition (all of its nine members save for Xi and Li are expected to retire in 2012) will also reflect the balance of power between those who believe that maintaining economic growth is necessary to legitimize the Party’s right to monopoly rule, in short the economic reformers, and those who think that legitimacy should be based on ideology, a group for whom the current Maoist nostalgia stands proxy. Many other currents–political, nationalistic, regional and demographic–cut across that divide. Even the princelings are not a monolithic bloc. Factional alliances exist among those who want to develop a more harmonious form of capitalism with a strong safety net, a narrowing of the wealth gap and more environmental protections; those harderliner economic reformers who want to diminish the power of the public sector and open up political reforms to embrace a new propertied class; and the so-called neo-comms, who want to asset China’s global power through cultural diplomacy, military strength and taking a greater role in international institutions.

Who gets promoted from the Politburo to its standing committee, and how they rank, will reveal to some extent how those divides lie and thus how China develops over the next decisive decade. But all are united in preserving the Party’s grip on power.

Footnote: State media have published the transcript of written answers Xi gave to questions from the Washington Post on the eve of his visit to the U.S. His comments on Sino-American relations were mostly pro-forma, including a note of warning sounded to the U.S. over its military stance in the Pacific.

2 Comments

Filed under China-U.S.

The Battle Behind The Birthday For A Billion

China's top leaders mark the 90th anniversary of the Communist Party of China in Beijing, July 1, 2011.

China’s Communist Party is celebrating the 90th anniversary of its founding on July 1, 1921 with even more pomp and pageantry than it exhibited two years ago on the 60th anniversary of its coming to power in 1949. But behind the “birthday party for a billion” (though the Party has only 80 million members) is its most important leadership transition in the three decades since Deng Xioaping set the party and country on the road of economic reform.

China’s next top leaders will, for the first time, be men born after the Party seized power in 1949. With their ascendancy from next year, modern China will cross a political and demographic Rubicon. Their generation is the great, great grandchild of Mao’s first generation of leaders. Their youth occurred during the Cultural Revolution, when many of their families were purged, but they embraced the Party nevertheless, and many advanced through its ranks by being “redder than red”. They are more worldly than their predecessors, mostly educated at top Chinese universities, more likely than their predecessors to have social science rather than engineering degrees, and be more likely to send their own children to top U.S. and European universities. Their working political life has only known China transforming itself as a rising political and economic power, yet they are as pragmatically committed as their predecessors to the Party’s monopoly on power, if divided over whether the basis for that should be ideological or economic.

The distinction matters. China is at a critical stage of its economic development. It has, self-evidently, developed at great pace through the initial phases of industrialization and urbanization over the past 30 years. Now it must kick on and leap the great wall that has stopped other developing nations completing the transformation to a developed economy.

When per capita income reaches $10,000-12,000 a year (in 2007 dollars), developing economies tend to stop developing without institutional change. China’s annual per capital income is $4,000. At current growth rates that gives it less than a decade–the watch of the new leadership–before it hits the wall. It will need to make deep structural reforms, both economic and political, if it is going to be able to vault it. Regardless of the fact that even if it does clear the wall, China will still be a middle-income country–absolute size of the economy is irrelevant in this respect, even if China passes the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy–no country has yet managed to be both developed and a single-party state.

That sets up a dilemma. If the Party’s legitimacy to monopolistic rule depends on continuing to deliver the economic growth that keeps its citizens getting richer and the country stronger and if China’s rapid economic growth cannot continue beyond a certain point without institutional reform, then managing the role of government in the economy and overcoming state-owned vested interests–in other words reforming itself–becomes the new leadership’s most important concern.

If, on the other hand, the Party’s legitimacy to monopolistic rule rests on an ideology of the mandate of Mao, it will still need to forge a statist economy that can deliver the economic development to ensure social stability and regional clout, and be unable to escape the fact that economic growth cannot continue beyond a certain point without institutional reform to support its move up the arc of development and prevent the ossifying of incumbent interests. So, again, managing the role of government in the economy and arbitrating between state-owned vested interests becomes the new leadership’s most important concern.

China is not only self-evidently non-Western, but it has a self-consciously distinct history, culture and political system, so it could develop a distinct economic system. Chinese exceptionalism is not anymore unreasonable than American exceptionalism. But in that event, the Party will still have to operate and against a back-drop of a globally connected economy in a world that is already wary of China’s perceived mercantilism and rising power and status. Though unlikely, that could make China turn inward and neo-isolationist, relying on its growing internal market and a demographic bias to becoming a deficit country over the next decade, to drive the next stage in its economic development.

For now, there is every indication that China will continue on its present course. Indeed, there is a plan for that. The new leadership will come into position midway though the current five-year plan. Yet what looks from the outside to be a seamless transfer of power from one generation of leadership to the next belies the factional infighting that occurs out of public view.

So far, it is the princelings, the descendants of Mao’s original revolutionary leaders, an elite collective dynasty of some 400 families who hold extensive sway over the Party, army and the economy, that are coming out on top. One of their own, Xi Jinping (second from the right in the picture above), born 1953, is emerging as Hu Jintao’s successor as paramount leader, successively taking over from Hu the positions of Party general secretary in 2012, president in 2013 and chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2014. By then the top Party, state and military jobs will again be united in one man, if Xi successfully consolidates over the course of the two-year transition his position as the first ranked in the Politburo’s standing committee, the small group of men, currently nine, that constitute the inner sanctum of the Party’s–and China’s–power.

Xi has outflanked Li Keqiang (second from left in the picture above), the only other post-49er to make it to the Politburo’s standing committee, where he ranks seventh out of nine, one place below Xi, and who was Hu’s protege until Hu bowed to political realities and switched his support to Xi. Li, like Hu rose through the Party’s other leading faction, the Communist Youth League (YCL) whose power base is the party’s grassroots. Princelings dismissively refer to the leaders who come up through the YCL as “sons of shopkeepers.”

Xi rise from provincial official to national leader has been rapid. Cunning, calculating and ambitious Xi plays politics like a chameleon playing poker. He has worked in the countryside and in cities, north and south, in villages and in big cities, giving him a broad network of connections. He is a student of Marxism but not known to be ideological. Though never in the army, he has strong links with the armed forces. His father, General Xi Zhongxun, was a founding father of Mao’s revolution and his wife, Peng Liyuan, is both a celebrity folk singer and a major general in the PLA. He has a reputation for being pro-business (his father was purged by Mao for promoting economic opening and became one of Deng Xiaoping’s key mentors and lieutenants in instituting economic reform, particularly the early experiments in Guangdong and Shenzhen) but he is also famous for being ‘clean’, having cleared up corruption in Fujian in the 1990s and Shanghai in the 2000s, and is disdainful of China’s nouveau riche. He is calm, cautious, and above all seen as a “team player”–while all the while skillfully climbing a ladder of political patrons.

Though scarcely charismatic, Xi will be a more imposing figure on the world stage than his predecessors (though Hu set a low bar). Physically, he is tall and stocky so photo shoots with other world leaders will play well at home. With a sister in Canada, a brother in Taiwan and a daughter at Harvard in the U.S., to which he has been a visitor since the 1970s, he knows more about the world than the world knows about this plain- if rarely outspoken man who plays his political cards close to his chest–or about what he and his fellow new leaders want to do once they reach the apex of power they have scrabbled so hard to ascend.

As already noted, they will take over half way through the current five-year plan, so their initial path is set. But the next Politburo’s composition (all of its nine members save for Xi and Li are expected to retire in 2012) will also reflect the balance of power between those who believe that maintaining economic growth is necessary to legitimize the Party’s right to monopoly rule, in short the economic reformers, and those who think that legitimacy should be based on ideology, a group for whom the current Maoist nostalgia stands proxy.  Many other currents–political, nationalistic, regional and demographic–cut across that divide. Even the princelings are not a monolithic bloc. Factional alliances exist among those who want to develop a more harmonious form of capitalism with a strong safety net, a narrowing of the wealth gap and more environmental protections; those harderliner economic reformers who want to diminish the power of the public sector and open up political reforms to embrace a new propertied class; and the so-called neo-comms, who want to asset China’s global power through cultural diplomacy, military strength and taking a greater role in international institutions.

Who gets promoted from the Politburo to its standing committee, and how they rank, will reveal to some extent how those divides lie and thus how China develops over the next decisive decade. But all are united in preserving the Party’s grip on power.

9 Comments

Filed under Politics & Society