Tag Archives: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Pakistan’s Imran Needs To Reassure China

Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan (left), at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, February 6, 2022. Photo credit: Xinhua/Liu Weibing

AFTER VLADIMIR PUTIN, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan, seen on the left in the photograph above, is arguably the highest-profile visiting world leader to attend the Beijing Winter Olympics.

Pakistan is a strategically important interconnection between the two halves of The Belt and Road. Imran’s meetings with President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang resulted in a lengthy statement affirming the importance of bilateral ties, with notable mention of joint commitment to the $64 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The corridor has been under attack by ethnic Baloch militants seeking independence for a vast, mountainous, mineral-rich region that straddles Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.

A low-level insurgency has been underway for two decades. Chinese nationals and infrastructure along the corridor have become favoured targets. At its northern end lies Xinjiang province with its onward connections to the energy markets of China and Central Asia, and at the southern, Gwadar on the Gulf of Oman close to the border with Iran and where China is developing a deep-water port and naval base.

The level of violence has flared up in recent weeks, with dozens of deaths of Pakistani military and militants. Attacks on army posts in Pakistan’s Balochistan province the day before Imran arrived in Beijing were better coordinated and more sophisticated than before. The timing is unlikely to have been coincidental.

Baloch militants greeted Imran’s return from Beijing with another attack on the provincial capital, Quetta.

Although Islamabad has got its latest bailout programme with the IMF, for $6 billion, back on track, Pakistan’s economy remains in a parlous state. It still needs Beijing’s money and China remains its key partner in a delicate four-way geopolitical dance also involving India and the United States.

Imran has also been battling with the Pakistani Taliban Movement. Both it and the Balochistan Nationalist Army claimed responsibility for a deadly bombing in Lahore last month.

The Pakistani prime minister will have had to reassure his increasingly nervous hosts that he is on top of the security situation. Tellingly, the first thing he did on his return from Beijing was to cancel a scheduled Cabinet meeting to visit Balochistan province to discuss the corridor and the security situation.


Filed under China-Pakistan

China Will Move Cautiously But Purposefully In Afghanistan

Map showing location of Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan

BEIJING HAS PROBABLY been as taken aback as the rest of the world by the speed with which the Taliban has resumed control of Afghanistan — and created an American-sized power vacuum in the region.

China will, however, be in no hurry to rush in to fill it, even as its leaders take private delight in what they will regard as further evidence of the global decline of the United States.

In the near term, Beijing will happily profess its philosophy of non-interference in another country’s domestic affairs. At the same time, it will buy as much peace and stability from the Taliban as it can while keeping the Wakhan Corridor tightly bottled up.

The eastern end of the Wakhan Corridor, a remote mountain valley on the ‘roof of the world’, forms China’s short (less than 100 kilometres) horseshoe-shaped border with Afghanistan. An ancient trade route spilling into Xinjiang through the Wakhjir Pass, it has long been closed at the Chinese end for fear of the drugs, Uighur separatists or other extremists that might flow through it. Tajikistan and Pakistan, to the north and south, respectively, also provide a physical buffer between Afghanistan and China.

Beijing provided modest military and economic support for the now-collapsed Kabul government for the past several years — including training some of the police who melted away in the face of the Taliban advance. Yet, it will have no compunction about pivoting to deal with the Taliban.

It has probably already used its influence in Pakistan to build connections with the new regime. It can offer security and economic assistance in return for protecting Chinese commercial interests and assurances that the Taliban will not support Uyghur militant forces or allow them to use the country as a base or transit route.

As a secondary objective, it will also seek the use of the Taliban’s influence in assuaging its growing security concerns for Chinese citizens and interests along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The ‘March West‘ policy since the mid-2010s has led Beijing to be increasingly involved in West Asia and the Middle East, not only deepening its relationships with Iran and Pakistan but expanding engagement with other regional powers such as Saudia Arabia.

However, what should have been a serious complication for China’s regional relationships — its treatment of the Uighurs — has been notably buttoned down by Beijing. Few Middle Eastern leaders have spoken out publicly on this — a sign of the importance of the growing ties in other areas plus Beijing’s ability to use its economic clout to dampen international criticism of its domestic policies.

The March West is, however, a journey of influence and transactional relationships, not empire. Beijing knows full well that Afghanistan is a graveyard of empires.

The issue that Beijing will eventually have to face in Afghanistan is the one that has confronted other outside powers before it: it is difficult to maintain a neutral position in a part of the world where there are so many overlapping and longstanding rivalries and conflicts.

It will be even more challenging when the time comes, as it surely will, for Beijing to step up its diplomatic and security engagement beyond the purely mercantilist.

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Filed under China-Central Asia, China-Pakistan