Politics, Not Debt Will Drive The Deleveraging Of China’s SOEs

MOODY’S CREDIT DOWNGRADE of China caught the attention of the public prints, ever ready, in some quarters at least, to see the prophesied hard landing just around the corner, with the economy crumpling under the weight of an oncoming rush of bad debt. S&P did much the same as Moody’s back in March with much less general notice. In its commentary, Moody’s falls over itself to emphasise the long-term nature of the risk.

As this Bystander has argued before, while China’s debt-to-GDP ratio is large, and has grown in recent years, it remains manageable by Beijing, even in the event of a crisis, and the risk of external contagion is small.

That is not to say it is not of concern to policymakers. It is. It is concentrated in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local authorities. SOE debt, at 115% of GDP is concerning. (In Japan and South Korea state-owned corporate debt is about 30% of GDP). And the finance ministry has noted that some local authorities, caught between paying for shutting down loss-making state industries or subsidising them to keep them going, and no longer able to rely on land sales to square their books, are struggling to cover operating expenses.

All this is also a sign, widely commented on by the likes of the IMF, World Bank and the OECD, that the old-school means of state-led infrastructure investment to keep growth going are persisting to the detriment of ‘rebalancing’.  Those two points come together politically.

The political event of the year is, self-evidently, the Party plenum to be held later this year. This is no ordinary plenum, as it is the scene-setter for the next generation of leadership. President Xi Jinping’s legacy is at stake.

Vested interests lying in the way of economic reform have not been fully removed by the anti-corruption campaign. Many of those same interests would also end up on the wrong side of any aggressive debt resolution, given both the individual companies that would be involved and the structural reforms necessary to governance and financial markets.

So, for now, authorities are biding their time over the debt question. The economy has stabilised sufficiently to buy them a few more months of inaction; candidate Trump’s threatened trade war has been headed off; the razzmatazz around One Belt, One Road sustains hopes of new export markets for excess capacity.

Once Xi has consolidated his political control at the plenum, then the debt busters will start to move in.

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2 Comments

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2 responses to “Politics, Not Debt Will Drive The Deleveraging Of China’s SOEs

  1. Pingback: China Bystander

  2. Pingback: China’s ‘Achilles’ Heel’ Of Debt | China Bystander

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