U.S. President Barack Obama’s re-election has made moot the vacuous threat that China would be declared a currency manipulator on day one of the new administration as the Republican challenger Mitt Romney had promised to do had he won. Though China’s senior officials know enough of American presidential campaigns to ignore the shrillest words spoken on the campaign trail (and we may have Harvard University to thank for some of that, according to Bloomberg), Beijing is rarely a big fan of change. It will be happier with the devil it knows. One point of relief all round is that the unpredictability of an early test of a President Romney by Pyongyang will have been avoided. Yet it is worth asking how a second term Obama administration’s policy towards China could change from the first.
That was marked by Washington’s Asian pivot in foreign policy, still seen as a policy of containment of China by a hegemonic U.S. It will not escape Beijing’s notice that Obama’s first post-re-election-victory foreign trip will take in its old ally, Myanmar, which is shaping up as a testing ground of the competing thesis of whether economic reform has to precede political reform, the so-called Beijing consensus, or whether the two can move in lockstep, the Washington view. Yet the relationship between the superpowers is better characterized as increasingly tetchy, particularly over trade, tempered by the reality that they still have to deal with each other on a range of issues where their interests also range from competitive to common.
There was a cautionary note in Beijing’s official congratulations to Obama on his re-election, an expression of hope that the end to the election campaign would put an end to what it called the China-bashing game. That was played louder and more irrationally on the campaign trail by Romney, as is the wont of challengers unencumbered by the reality of office. Obama, as an incumbent, gets to play it for real.
The Obama administration has been ratcheting up the number of complaints about China it has filed to the World Trade Organization (and Beijing has responded in kind, we should note). There was one that is particularly significant to this Bystander’s eye. In September, Washington formally complained to the WTO about what it said were unfair subsidies to China’s auto and auto-parts makers. Obama needed, and got, the American auto workers vote this week. It won for him Ohio, one of half dozen key swing states with large numbers of electoral college votes and where one in eight jobs is tied to the auto industry, and Michigan, home state of Detroit and the Romney family as it happens. The labour vote also won for Obama Wisconsin, home state of Romney’s running mate, Paul Ryan.
One WTO complaint filing doesn’t make a swing, of course. Obama’s bail out of General Motors and Chrysler after the 2008 global financial crisis mattered a great deal more. Oddly, that was a lot less politically popular at the time of 2010’s mid-term elections, in which Obama’s Democrats were pummeled. But we do expect organized labor to be looking for a thank-you for turning that round and rallying to Obama’s cause this time.
We think that will manifest itself as intensifying trade disputes with Beijing, not just over the traditional parts of the car industry, such as tires and auto parts, but also wherever it touches the new technologies for alternative fuels and electric vehicles, solar power being one example of where it is already happening. As the Obama administration has been subsidizing electric vehicle development, that will provide plenty of scope, too, for Beijing to retaliate.
Greater trade friction is also inevitable as recovery of the U.S. economy requires export growth, an avowed Obama goal, and with that acceleration of bi- and multi-lateral free trade negotiations, a game Beijing is playing, too. The TransPacific Trade Partnership could become a priority project for Obama as he looks to foreign policy in his second term to define his legacy. If there is a silver lining to any of that, it is that the detailed and unglamorous work of trade diplomacy could become a proxy for the security relationship, which then has some room to deteriorate, if it needs to on a rhetorical rather than real basis–and that might be driven as much as anything by internal Chinese politics as Xi Jinping establishes his grip on power with former Presidents Hu and Jiang looking over either shoulder.
There is one piece of change that we know is coming to Washington’s diplomatic front. U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has said she won’t do a second term in that exhausting office, and her assistant secretary of state for East Asia, Kurt Campbell, is also unlikely to continue. Senator John Kerry and U.N. ambassador Susan Rice are two names being floated as Clinton’s successor. Kerry might be the more welcome in Beijing. Rice would come fresh from the Security Council battles over Iraq and Syria.