IMF Sees Increases In China’s Growth And Debt

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY Fund (IMF) has upgraded both its economic growth forecast for China in 2018 and the downside risks of debt.

In its July update to its World Economic Outlook, the Fund says its projections reflect the strong first quarter growth this year and expectations of continued fiscal support.

It now says it expects growth next year to be 6.7%, the same as this year and in 2016, and 0.1 percentage point higher than previously forecast. Growth in 2018 is expected to slow by 0.2 percentage points less than previously projected, to 6.4%.

This the Fund believes will be because authorities will sustain high public investment to achieve the target of doubling in real terms 2010’s GDP by 2020. This, in turn, implies that debt levels will not be attacked as actively as needed and financial reforms delayed.

The National Financial Work Conference, the high level policymaking agency chaired by President Xi Jinping that concluded its quinquennial meeting on July 15, emphasized that policymakers’ priority was to deleverage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within its focus on limiting systemic financial risk.

First, though, Xi has to get through the forthcoming Party plenum, which should provide clues to the strength of his position to tackle the politically powerful interests that control the SOEs.

Leave a comment

Filed under Economy

China’s Growth Spurt Provides Scope To Tackle Debt

TALK OF A hard landing for the economy seems distant, now. China’s economy grew by 6.9% in the second quarter year-on-year, the same as in the first quarter and well ahead of the official target of 6.5%, the National Statistics Bureau reports.

Quater-to-quarter growth quickened to 1.7% from 1.3%. Industrial output (up 7.6% in the first half) and consumption (retail sales were up 11% in June year-on-year) picked up while investment remained strong, suggesting that measures to control the frothy housing market have not yet worked through, or perhaps are not working as effectively as policymakers intended. Property investment increased by 8.5% year-on-year in the first half.

The extent to which property prices cool over the rest of the year will be closely watched. If they do, despite the solid underpinnings of the recovery, the growth rate may moderate in the second half, though not to the extent the official target will be threatened.

The long-term build-up of structural imbalances, manifest in the growing levels of debt, remains, but the latest growth figures give the leadership some scope for pushing through financial reforms at the party plenum later this year.

Some of those, notably the expansion of bond markets to allow direct financing of local governments and enterprises in place of policy lending by banks, will have been thrashed out at the two-day National Financial Work Conference that ended at the weekend.

That this quinquennial meeting chaired by President Xi Jinping was convened a year late this time indicates how politically contentious economic reform remains, not least because they also intend to rein in the debt of state owned enterprises, themselves powerful political fiefdoms.

1 Comment

Filed under Economy

Djibouti Bound

Chinese warships leaving Zhanjiang, Guangdong province, China on July 11, 2017 bound for China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti. Photo credit: Xinhua/Wu Dengfeng.

CHINESE MILITARY PERSONNEL are now en route for Djibouti where they will garrison China’s first overseas military base, which it started building last year at a cost of $590 million.

The photo above shows the departure from Zhanjiang in Guangdong province of the South Sea Fleet’s Jinggang Shan, a Yuzhao class Type 071 amphibious transport dock that had previously been deployed in the search for the missing Malaysia Airlines Flight 370,  along with a second PLA-Navy ship, China’s sole semi-submersible Donghai Island class naval auxiliary ship.

The Horn of Africa country, only half as big again as municipal Beijing, is already home to US, French and Japanese military bases with a Saudi Arabian one, like China’s, under construction.

China’s base will be used for supporting peacekeeping (Beijing has deployed its first UN peacekeeping combat troops in South Sudan), international anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden (in which China has taken part since 2008) and humanitarian aid.

It will also provide advanced support, should it be needed, for the more than 250,000 Chinese now working in Africa — and the Chinese investments where they work. Evacuations of nationals have already been needed in Libya and Yemen.

China stresses that Djibouti will be a logistics or support, not military base. The question is, however it is described, whether it is the first of one, several or many such overseas beachheads.

The US defence department’s recent annual report to the US Congress on China’s military prowess took this definitive view:

As China’s global footprint and international interests have gown, its military modernization program and become more focused on supporting missions beyond China’s periphery, including power projection, sea land security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). In February 2016, China began constitution of a military base in Djibouti that could be complete within the next year. China likely will seek to establish additional military based in countries with which it has long-standing, friendly relationships.

The US defence department pinpoints Pakistan as best fitting that bill. Given the growing economic interests at stake in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which runs through both some insecure but strategically important territory, and China’s extensive role in building a deep-water port at Gwadar on the Arabian Sea coast, that seems a logical deduction.

However, many other countries will not be receptive to the notion of hosting PLA bases, and Chinese military doctrine sees prowess in cyber, space and information warfare as more potent than building a traditional network of military allies.

Indeed, current doctrine sees power projection assets as a vulnerability in modern warfare. That alone will be cause for China to move cautiously on establishing further bases.

At the same time, Beijing will use China’s economic linkages to cement support among those with similar security interests and to deter adversary power projection in third countries, particularly that by the United States.

For now, gaining access to foreign commercial ports for as a logistics base and for pre-positioning of support of “far seas” deployments by the PLA-Navy is likely to be the order of the day. That, anyway, is what would be needed for the HA/DR operations that Beijing is likely to concentrate on while its military learns to find its way around the world.

Leave a comment

Filed under China-Africa, China-Pakistan, China-U.S., Defence, Uncategorized

North Korea: Trade, Opportunity And Russia

Rajin Port, North Korea, 2011. Photo credit: Laika ac. Licenced under Creative Commons.

EVEN WITH UN trade sanctions against North Korea in place, China’s trade with North Korea rose 15% in the first five months of this year to just over $2 billion, according to customs data.

China is certainly buying less from North Korea, principally because it suspended coal purchases in February in response to North Korea’s fifth nuclear test in defiance of UN demands. However, it is still importing iron ore.

In the other direction, more Chinese oil (up 18% year-on-year) and goods, notably telephone equipment, textiles, soybean oil and vehicles, are flowing into North Korea.

The first-quarter data, which show a 37.4% rise in total trade, has drawn the predictable irascible tweet from US President Donald Trump, whose administration is showing signs of increasing frustration with Beijing’s attempts to be cooperative in reining in Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons ambitions.

The debate is intensifying in Washington over how honest an ‘honest broker’ Beijing is over North Korea. Is it, too, as frustrated with Pyongyang as its public statements suggest? Or is it less than neutral, still supporting Kim Jong-un’s regime to greater or lesser extent.

The darker conspiracists in Washington believe Beijing is ‘running’ North Korea with the end of keeping the peninsula on the brink of instability to keep US regional allies diverted from China issues while making China, as North Korea’s only ally and main aid donor, the essential partner in any brokered solution that never comes.

This Bystander thinks that a conspiracy theory too far, not least because subcontracting the maintenance of managed instability to the agency of the Kim dynasty seems such a high risk.

More likely, to our mind, China is protecting its red-line position. Beijing does not want the Pyongyang regime to collapse for fear of the outcome being a US-aligned unified Korea on its border, over which an influx of North Korean refugees, possibly starving, will already have poured.

Thus it will lean on Kim, but not heavily enough to topple him. This leaves the United States squeezed between taking direct action — which is everyone’s last resort, though one that Trump may resort to more readily than others — and imposing further sanctions, most likely next targeted at more banks and companies, including Chinese companies, thought to be financing North Korean trade, especially illicit trade.

Remittances by North Koreans working abroad are another potential target. A UN report in 2015 estimated that there were more than 50,000 North Koreans working abroad in mining, logging, textile and construction industries around the world, generating  $2.3 billion a year for the regime.

Which is one of the points where Russia enters the picture. Along with China, Russia is the main employer of North Korean workers. Thirty thousand North Koreans are estimated to work there.

Earlier this month, the Russian ambassador to the UN rejected the United States’ call for new sanctions against North Korea following its latest missile test. Instead, though it supported previous UN sanctions, it repeated China’s calls for restraint on all sides, similarly worried about the risk of instability that could be triggered by a strict sanctions regime.

Washington views the Russian position on North Korea, which is suspects to be opportunistic, sceptically, and as a sanctions busting. Last month, it imposed sanctions on two Russian companies, one for allegedly supplying a North Korean firm involved in the nuclear programme, the other for shipping petroleum products to North Korea.

Russia’s trade with North Korea is minimal: total trade last year was worth $77 million. That is a deceptive figure because much of the trade goes via China. Up to $500 million would be more realistic.

Still relatively tiny (and nothing compared to what it was in Soviet days). However, it jumped in the first quarter of this year, by 85% year-on-year, according to Russia’s customs service. The bulk of this consisted of Russian exports of coal ($26.7 million-worth) and oil ($1.2 million-worth).

Often forgotten, there is a railway that runs from the Russian side of the short Russia-North Korea border across the Tumen river to Rajin (seen above in a 2011 photograph), a North Korean port from which Siberian coal is shipped. New port facilities had been built in a joint venture with the South Koreans until they pulled out last year.

Sanctions-busting fuel deliveries to compensate for those lost from China also get through to North Korea clandestinely via this route. North Korean coal reportedly goes in the opposite direction. The line has four rails to accommodate both Russian and Korean gauge rolling stock.

However, the recent spike in Russian exports goes against the trend of falling exports over the previous three years, a trend mirrored by China, as it happens.

Last week, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, he and his Russian counterpart President Vladimir Putin said the two countries would co-operate to defuse the North Korean crisis. Russia will not undercut Beijing’s leadership on the issue, but it is steadily inserting itself into the equation and is likely to be opportunistic, adding a further layer of complexity and uncertainty to an already seemingly intractable situation.

Leave a comment

Filed under China-Koreas, China-Russia, Trade

It Is Rocket Science

China’s second Long March-5 rocket lifts off from the Wenchang Space Launch Center, Hainan on July 2. Photo credit: Xinhua

WE DO NOT yet know — and may not for some time — what was the ‘anomaly’ that caused the failure seemingly some 10 minutes after take-off of the new Long March-5 rocket launched on July 2.

Beyond the obvious national embarrassment of any such space programme failure, this particular one is damaging to China’s space programme. How damaging will not be clear until it is known whether the failure lay in the Long March-5 launch vehicle or its Dongfanghong-5 (DFH-5) satellite propulsion system payload.

This was only the second flight of the Long March-5, intended as the first of a family of work-horse heavy-lift launch vehicles for the forthcoming lunar and Mars space programmes that will frame China’s civil and military space programme for the next few decades. The rocket can lift twice the payload of any other Chinese rocket and is on a par with the most powerful launchers the Americans have.

The DFH-5 satellite propulsion system is similarly leading edge in its use of new technologies. It and intended to put the next generation of large geostationary telecoms and earth observation satellites in orbit and control them once there. This one was attached to the new (and heavy) experimental Shijian-18 communications satellite.

Such satellites could be used for a variety of communications services from internet connectivity to aeronautical services, distance learning and telemedicine, all of which will be of used for China’s planned high-tech civil and military development.

Unusually, the launch was covered live on TV. Although coverage ended abruptly and without explanation, authorities were, at least, spared the embarrassment of a catastrophic failure while the rocket was still visible to the cameras. However, it was a powerful reminder that space flight is dangerous, difficult and complex. It is rocket science.

Leave a comment

Filed under Space

Another Tragic Landslide

Rescue workers at the landslide site in Xinmo village, Maoxian county, Sichuan province, June 24, 2017It is a tragically familiar story. Heavy rains trigger a landslide in mountainous terrain leaving scores dead or missing presumed dead.

Its latest iteration is in Maoxian county in Sichuan, a three hours drive north of Chengdu. Fifteen are known to have died, but more than 120 are missing. The early-morning landslide buried 62 homes in Xinmo village, a tourist stop-off, blocked 2 kilometres of the river running through it and buried 1,600 meters of road, impeding rescue efforts.

Half the village was destroyed by the disaster. Only three people were rescued alive. According to state media, the village had been relocated to its present location in 1976 because its previous one was considered too landslide prone.

State media is full of exhortations from top leadership of all-out-rescue efforts and photographs as above of rescue workers in their readily recognisable orange kit and heavy earth moving machinery at the disaster site.

With it being the start of the flood season and the national weather observatory saying more heavy rain expected across the country in the next few days, national authorities have raised their geological disaster alert to the second highest.

Update: As of Monday, officials said 93 people were still unaccounted for. Fifteen residents thought to be missing were found to have been away from the area. The confirmed death toll was put at ten.

Leave a comment

Filed under Politics & Society

Too Innovative To Be True

Traffic-straddling busTHE GIANT TRAFFIC-STRADDLING bus that caught this Bystander’s somewhat skeptical eye last year (see above) has gone the way of many an idea that was too innovative for its own good. Nowhere.

Technical and financial shortcomings seem to have done for it, according to press reports. Latest reports say the test track is being dismantled.

Last year, shortly after the (very) short test run of a prototype Transit Elevated Bus (TEB) in Qinhuangdao, the Beijing News reported that the main investment promotor for it was Huaying Kailai, an asset management company blacklisted in 2015 for conducting illegal finance activities. The Global Times said the firm, part of the Huaying Land Group, also ran a peer-to-peer financing scheme that promised high returns but risked running out of cash.

Claims of cooperation agreements between the bus’s maker, TEB Technology Development, and municipal governments appear to have been as spurious as purported orders from three countries in Latin America.

Update: Police have arrested 32 people in connection with the failure of the TEB, including the CEO of TEB and founder of Huaying Kailai Asset Management, Bai Zhiming, and 31 Huaying Kailai employees.

Leave a comment

Filed under Energy, Industry, Transport