Huawei’s 5G Coins It In Despite Washington’s Objections

HUAWEI’S FIRST-QUARTER results suggest that the United States’s campaign against the world’s biggest telecoms equipment maker is having limited effect, especially outside the advanced economies.

The company has long denied Washington’s allegation that Beijing ultimately controls it and that its equipment could be used for espionage in the service of Chinese state security, the basis of the Trump administration’s campaign to prevent other governments from using Huawei’s 5G equipment.

Huawei says its income was 179.7 billion yuan ($26.8 billion) in January to March, a 39% increase on the same period a year earlier. It did not disclose its net profit but said it operated at an 8% net profit margin, slightly higher than in the first quarter of 2018.

It reported sales increases in all its three customer groups — carriers, enterprise and consumer customers. On the contentious 5G technology, it said it had signed 40 contracts with leading global carriers, and shipped more than 70,000 5G base stations, a number it expects to reach 100,000 by May. It says 2019 will be ‘a year of large-scale deployment of 5G around the world’.

In practice, only a handful of countries have heeded Washington’s exhortation to follow it in banning Huawei from their 5G telecoms network: Australia, New Zealand and Japan, all close US allies in Asia.

Europe, which will likely lead 5G rollouts — eleven EU countries have 5G auctions scheduled for this year and six for 2020, with 30% of its internet users expected to be on 5G by 2025 — has been more ambiguous in its response.

Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland and the United Kingdom all have expressed concerns about the cybersecurity risks of contracting a firm with opaque links to Beijing. However, Belgium has declined to ban Huawei, saying it has found no deliberate technological compromises in its equipment that could be misused by China’s state, but it will keep the equipment under review. Germany has taken a similar line but is drafting quality and cybersafety standards for 5G suppliers and talking about a ‘no-spying agreement with China.

France is debating 5G legislation that would impose extensive security tests. The report of a Dutch government investigation into Huawei is due in May when the United Kingdom is also expected to make a final decision. London has repeatedly raised concerns about Huawei equipment and the firm’s ability to fix cybersecurity problems but also has one eye on a post-Brexit trade deal with China.

For all of Europe, keeping China, a critical trade and investment ally, on side while securing the Internet of Things devices and automated vehicles that 5G will enable, from malicious state and non-state cyber attacks will be a delicate balancing act, made harder still by the current unease of the transAtlantic relationship. Washington may ban US firms from working with any others, including European firms, who use Huawei technologies and equipment.

Brussels and EU member governments will try to keep the decision-making process on the technical level and not get sucked into the political dimensions that saw Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer and daughter of its founder, Ren Zhengfei, arrested in Canada in December at Washington’s request on charges of bank and wire fraud in violation of US sanctions against Iran. (She denies wrongdoing.)

The European Commission’s recently published recommendations on 5G network cybersecurity rejected bans on specific suppliers (unnamed, but for which read Huawei) and told member states to come up with joint EU-wide security checks for firms building 5G networks in Europe by the end of this year.

While Europe will be an important beachhead for Huawei’s 5G equipment and offers a near-term market, the company is looking beyond Europe. Many parts of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East will transition from 2G/3G/4G to 5G over the next ten years. That is where Huawei’s future sales lie.

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China’s First-Quarter Growth Lays Base For Hitting 2019’s Target

FIRST-QUARTER GROWTH came in slightly better than expected at 6.4% (consensus estimates were for 6.3%), and unchanged from the final quarter of 2018, confirming that the targeted stimulus applied since the second half of last year is taking effect.

The combination of fiscal and monetary measures helped boost industrial production in March by 5% year-on-year and retail sales by 8.7%. Fixed asset investment increased by 6.3%.

Beijing is targeting growth for the year at between 6% and 6.5%.

The challenges remain balancing growth with deleveraging and the prospect of a slowing global economy. The outcome of the trade talks with the United States is the wildcard.

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IMF Sees No Reasons For China’s Economy Not To Stop Slowing

A chart showing China's slowing GDP growth trajectory, 2010-2024. Source: IMF, Bystander Media

The IMF’s CHANGE in its forecasts for China’s growth this year and next go in opposite directions to those for the global economy as a whole.

In the new edition of its World Economic Outlook, The Fund projects 6.3% GDP growth this year and 6.1% in 2020. That is a one-tenth of a percentage point increase and reduction respectively on the Fund’s forecast in January, which in turn was unchanged from its forecast last October. However, for the world economy, it has cut its projections for this year but sees faster expansion in 2020.

The upgrade to the China forecast for this year is in large part technical. The Fund has dropped the assumption made in its previous forecast that the US tariff rate on $200-billion worth of trade would rise as threatened by the Trump administration to 25% from 10%.

China’s growth had started slowing in the second half of 2018 as a result of the measures to deleverage and rein in shadow banking, and the increase in trade tensions with the United States. At the same time, the consequent slower domestic investment was accompanied by softening consumption, particularly for cars, whose sales declined with the ending of incentive programs. The economy expanded by 6.8% in the first half of 2018, but by only 6.0% in the second.

For this year, the Fund expects economic conditions to improve as stimulus kicks in. Nonetheless, the external environment will be challenging: the advanced economies are slowing down; trade tensions with the United States are likely to persist regardless of any deal being struck in the near future, and there is likely to be a gradual tightening of financial conditions consistent with some further removal of monetary policy accommodation by the US Federal Reserve.

Even assuming no further increase in tariffs and a continuation of fiscal stimulus by Beijing, China’s economic growth is projected to slow this year and into next as the underlying forces that slowed growth in the second half of last year persist.

Longer term, the Fund sees a gradual slowing of the economy to 5.5% annual GDP growth by 2024. This is assuming the successful continuation of rebalancing towards a private-consumption and services-based economy and of the authorities’ actions to slow the accumulation of debt and mitigate its associated vulnerabilities.

This Bystander has less confidence in the second assumption than in the first. Cuts to personal income tax and value-added tax for small and medium enterprises should help stimulate domestic consumption. However, authorities also eased back on deleveraging and injected liquidity through
cuts in bank reserve requirements.

Any excessive stimulus to support near-term growth through a loosening of credit standards or a resurgence of shadow banking activity and off-budget infrastructure spending would heighten financial vulnerabilities — another reason that President Xi Jinping may be anxious to secure a deal with US President Donald Trump sooner rather than later.

If no deal is reached with the United States, that will cast a dark shadow over the medium-term outlook.

The Fund acknowledges that some centrally financed on-budget fiscal expansion in 2019 may be appropriate to avoid a sharp near-term growth slowdown that could derail the overarching reform agenda. However, it says this should avoid large-scale infrastructure stimulus and instead “emphasize targeted transfers to low-income households so as to lower poverty and inequality”.

It also lays out its familiar shopping lists of structural reforms:

Reducing leverage in the economy will require:
⁃ continued scaling back of widespread implicit guarantees on debt;
⁃ early recognition and disposal of distressed assets; and
⁃ fostering more market-based credit allocation that better aligns risk-adjusted returns with borrowing costs.
Continued rebalancing will require:
⁃ a more progressive tax code;
⁃ higher spending on health, education, and social transfers; and
⁃ reduced barriers to labour mobility.
Enhancing productivity growth will require:
⁃ reducing the footprint of state-owned enterprises; and
⁃ further lowering barriers to entry in certain sectors, such as telecommunications and banking.

As an endnote, the World Economic Outlook devotes a whole chapter to the link between bilateral trade tariffs and trade imbalances, and questions whether bilateral trade imbalances can (or should) be addressed using bilateral trade measures. Its conclusion is a rebuff to US President Donald Trump’s stated intention of using tariffs to cut the US trade deficit with China. It concludes that:

Targeting bilateral trade balances will likely only lead to trade diversion, with limited impact on country-level balances. The findings of this chapter help explain why, despite the tariff measures, the US trade deficit is the largest it has been since 2008. The chapter also establishes that the negative impact of tariffs on output is significantly higher today than in 1995 owing to the bigger role of global supply chains in world trade.

The paradox is that Trump’s tariffs will not achieve their stated aim of achieving balanced trade and have imposed a cost on US manufacturers and farmers, bu have got Beijing to the table to negotiate over structural reforms to its development model that it has never been prepared to talk about before.

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US-China Trade Talk Progress Seems Real If Ill-Defined

VICE-PREMIER LIU HE will be back in Washington next week for a further round of trade talks with the United States.

This follows a lightning round in Beijing on Thursday and Friday with US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer. Afterwards, both sides talked up the progress made particularly, it is widely reported, over ‘forced technology transfer’, the requirement for foreign investors to yield intellectual property in return for market access.

There is still no official word on the chapter and verse of this progress, and the use of words such as ‘constructive ‘and ‘candid’ to describe the talks suggest significant sticking points remain, particularly over enforcement mechanisms, as we have noted before in regard to China’s proposed new foreign investment law. So this Bystander will reserve judgment for now.

Regardless, it does seem that Beijing is engaging with the issue to a degree that it has not before. Its old argument that there was nothing to talk about as forced technology transfer did not happen, has been abandoned for the threadbare nonsense that it always was.

The outstanding questions now are to what extent will Washington gloss over some of the unresolved matters and how far it will be prepared to go in making concessions that will let China’s top leadership not lose face domestically.

There will also need to be a close reading of the Chinese- and English-language versions of whatever final text of a deal is agreed for each of the six areas of discussion: forced technology transfer and cyber theft; intellectual property rights; services; currency; agriculture and non-tariff barriers to trade. Many a slip…

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China’s New Foreign Investment Law Ready-Made For A Trade Deal

THE NEW INWARD foreign direct investment law, rushed forward and freshly rubber-stamped by the National People’s Congress, ticks all the boxes that Washington would want to see ticked.

But then it has been framed to do just that.

It overtly levels the playing field between foreign and Chinese companies in that it forbids forced technology transfer as a condition of foreign investment approval and makes it a criminal offence for officials to share foreign investors’ commercially sensitive information with Chinese firms (furnishing that information remains mandatory for local subsidiaries of international firms, however). Intellectual property protection is high on the list of US negotiators’ demands in the current round of US-China trade talks.

It also holds out an olive branch on another of their demands, greater market access, by adopting a ‘negative list’ system. Any sector not explicitly restricted will be open to foreign investors. However, there will still be 48 sectors that will remain off-limits, such as gene research, religious education and news media, or only conditionally accessible, such as oil and gas exploitation, nuclear power and airlines.

Regardless, both aspects can be packaged up to mutual advantage, a ‘win’ for the US side and a ‘concession’ by the Chinese one, though in truth they are neither.

When the new law comes into force on January 1, 2020, as with all Chinese legislation, it will provide a framework that will be open to interpretation and subject to enabling rules and regulations and the rigidity and frequency with which it is implemented.

Enforcement and redress via the courts is another matter. The judiciary is subordinate to the Party. Courts, particularly the new specialist business courts have due process, but also know their place. Every foreign firm investing and operating in China needs to appreciate that, and the difference between rule of law and rule by law. China has the latter.

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Options Narrow For A China-US Trade Deal

SUMMITS ARE FOR signings. US President Donald Trump’s second summit meeting with North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi should never have taken place. Or at least not until after officials had worked out what the agreement between the two countries was going to be. President Xi Jinping is not prepared to put himself at risk of the sort of fall-out that followed Trump walking out on Kim and that summit ending prematurely with no agreement.

The presidents meeting at Trump’s Florida resort Mar-a-Lago pencilled in for the end of this month to sign-off on a China-US trade agreement remains no firmer that, with Terry Branstad, the US ambassador in Beijing confirming to the Wall Street Journal that a date had not been finalised. The boosterish talk a couple of weeks back that a deal was near enough to completion to suspend the introduction on March 1st of 25% US tariffs on $200-billion-worth of Chinese exports is heard no more.

The sticking points of the agreement are proving as intractable as this Bystander has suspected all along that they would be, particularly over state subsidies, market access and forced technology transfers. No country readily changes its economic development model without either good cause or great pressure.

However, even the mechanism for monitoring and enforcing an agreed timetable for China to remove tariffs is proving difficult to nail down, as is getting the US side to agree to a schedule to withdraw its tariffs. The enforcement mechanism must be “two way, fair and equal,” Vice Commerce Minister Wang Shouwen said this weekend.

The US president is pushing for an early conclusion to a deal for political reasons. He needs demonstrable benefits from it to take into his 2020 re-election campaign. Xi also needs a deal that avoids him looking as if he has come off second best to the United States or has done anything to exacerbate the current slowdown in the economy.

For both, a narrow trade deal with enforcement mechanisms around only tariff-removal regimes seems more and more likely. Beyond that, Beijing will agree to buy more US produce and industrial goods and codify economic reforms that it is already planning to introduce. The more significant structural issues will be kicked down the road.

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US-China Trade Dispute Moves From Technical To Political Phase

US PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP has extended the March 1 deadline for raising tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese imports pending a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping in Florida probably in the second half of next month.

Trump tweeted that ‘substantial’ progress had been made in the high-level trade talks between the two countries.

State media have used the same description of the progress.

The negotiating teams have been working on the text of an agreement that will cover currency, cyber theft and forced technology transfers, services, agriculture, intellectual property and non-tariff barriers. These texts will provide the framework for what state media call ‘the next phase’ of discussions.

There is no official readout from either side of what that progress is but it is thought to have been greatest over the yuan-dollar rate, technology transfer, intellectual property protection and non-tariff barriers — all areas in which Beijing has already been moving in support of its long-term economic reforms to rebalance the economy. China will also be making some immediate large purchases of US goods and produce to cut its headline trade deficit with the United States.

The sticking points are likely to remain subsidies and other supports to state-owned companies, which go to the heart of China’s economic development model.

Until the finalised texts can be seen, it will be impossible to judge what ‘substantial progress’ means, what the pace and scope of it will be, what remains unsettled and what mechanisms will be put in place to monitor and enforce whatever is agreed.

The US team will make one more visit to China for further discussions on that. The fact that Xi is going to meet Trump in Florida in late March rather than on Hainan Island immediately after the Trump-Kim Jong-un summit is a sign of how much of a gap there is between the two sides still, and how little Beijing has conceded on that score.

There is also the little-mentioned question of what concessions will be expected of the United States.

For now, however, it will be all about appearances and how the two presidents control the ‘optics’ of an agreement, which both men need to appear to domestic constituencies as a ‘win-lose’ deal more than a ‘win-win’ one.

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